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FORCE ALPHA OPERATIONS IN THE EAST Fsorce Alpha a makeshift maritime task force conducted daring operation during the 1971 war in the eastern waters. The force comprised of two gunboats Padma and Plasah a watercraft Panel and Ship Chitrangad a. Commander Mohan Narayan Rao Samant an ouystander submariner was the leading officer of this force.According to him After war was declared.Lt General Aurora andajor General Jacob ordered me to organize a maritime attack on chaln and Mongla. This was because the Indian Army 41 Brigade was directly locked in combat with its Pakistani counterpart to take over the chalna and Khulna area but was facing difficulties. So the next best alternative was to mount an attack from seaward to dislocate the Pakistani troops. The task assigned to force Alpha was to launch a maritime attack on the port complex of chalna and Mongla to dislocate enemy forces. It was a maritime attack enemy forces.

THE MEGHNA HELI- - LIFT Iv Corps under the command of Lt Gen sagstsingh located at Teliamura about 40 Kms from Agartala was tasked to carry the Eastern thrust into East Pakistan. Go capt Chandan Singh the station commander at jorhat was to support the corps in the offensive. 110 Helicopter Unit HU with 10 Soviet Mi4 helicopter based at Kumbhirgram near silchar was also support By 3 December 1971, the helicopters were positioned at Teliamura with corps.Their strength was later augmented with some helicpters from 105 and 111 helicopter units. The task of the Mi4 helicopters is primarily casualty evacuation and transportation and were engaged on the job during the first four days. The first special Heli Borne Operation SHBO for crops was carried by the IAF on 7 December evening from Kailashar. From here troop of 4/5 GR and their equipment were Heli lifted to the outskirts of Sypher. Eight Mi 4s carried 254 troops and 400 kgs of equipment in 22 sorties ground fire. This SHBO was the trigger for more such operations in the coming days.  The operational directive given to corps did not envisage the capture of Dhaka. The assigned task was to protect Indian Territory from Assam to Mizoram. In doing so a limited offensive could be launched against Pakistani forces east east of River Megha to occupy comila chandpur, Reno and Chittagong .

BATTLE OF GADRA ROAD India has a lond bvorder with Pakistan in Rajasthan spreading over 1070 km. The land on both sides of the border is a desert marked by sand dunes shaped in long ridgrs. The movement of vehicles and the logistic support is best maintained by the camels. Gadra village, situated on the  indo pak border is obout 75 km from barmer. As eight km sand track linked indian gadra Road railway station to Pakistan gadra city khokhrapar is the first Pakistani station across the border while Munabao is the last on the Indian side. both are of straegic significance.  During Indo Pak War of 1971 the conduct of operations in the sind Rajasthan Sector as entrusted to soutern command. the sector was divided in Bikaner jaisalmer barmer and kutch sub sector for the purpose of operations. Lt Gen GG Bewoor GOC in C Southern Command had assigned the Barmer area to 11 Infantey Division It deployed 31 Infantry Brigade Group 15 kumaon 18 Madras 13  field Regiment and 3 Independent Armoured Squadron in Barmer sub sector to deny any intrusion into barmer and also to undertake operations to capture varea khokhropar and gadra city the 15 Kumaon planned the attack on gadra city on the night of 4/5 Decemder in complete secrecy in three phases; Phase 1. Capture of Whale Back area by 2100 her on 04 Dec. Phase 2. Capture of Dune area by 0200 hrs on 05 Dec. Phase 3. Capture of High Ground and Ridge area by 0800 her on 05 Dec.  As per the plan phase one the operation was launched at specified time. The Battalion did not encounter munch resistance and whale Back area in Pakistan was occupied. It the Second Phase Pakistanis fought back the indian attack with small area and medium machine guns MMG. But the relentess charge with war cry kali mata ki jai by kumaonis unnervedyhe enemy.

BATTLE OF ISLAMGARH In the heart of the desert of Rajasthan ISLAMGARH fort was built during the regime of Raja Rawal Siri Bheem Singh in 1665. Initially it was named as Bheem war fort but later in 1780 a Muslim ruler Ikhtiar Khan renamed it as Islamgarh fort. After partition it became a part of bahawalpur district of Punjab Pakistan. Strategically, Islamgarh is important as it lies on the line of communication in Rajasthan. The road from here leads to Rahimyar Khan in  the North an Jaisalmer in India. During the Indo Pak istan army in good strength. It was well fortified and extensive minefields around made an approach to it difficult. In 1971, the 3 Battalion of the Rajputana Rifles was deployed at Kishangarh in the Rajasthan sector to deny the enemy Islamgarh shakirewala passage to tanot. The enemy Islamgarh shakirewala passage to tanot. On the evening of 4 December 1971, 3 Rajputana Rifles was ordered to advance to Islamgarh and capture it by 0600 you're the next day. As lslamgarh was 16 km away from the international  border the battalion had to march around 30 KMS in one night to accomplish the task at 1739 hours a company commented march as vanguard followed by battalion headquartered and B company. 

BATTLE OF DERA BABA NANAK During the 1971war the defence of the Punjab sector was ntrusted to the corps commanded by Lt Gen NC Rawlley. It's area of responsibility extended approximately 650 km along the international border. The corps had assigned different defended sectors to it's formations and the 15 Indfantry Division under AJ Gen BM Be hattacharjea was assigned the responsibility of Amritsar sector, including the prominent towns of Amitd, DERA BABA NANAK and A BM also. The 86 Infa me try Brigade of the Divisio MN he LL d in For era Baba M as nak area. Against the Indian c ok Ros Pakistan has deployed 4 crops commanded by LL t Gn Bahadur sher. It's 19 infantry Division under Maj agen SAZ Naqvi was arrayed opposist 15 Indian infantry Division. The small town of Derek Naha NANAK formed a part of Amritsar sector. The re re were two strategically important enclaves in it's cvicinity the Indian enclave to the nort of the Ravu river called kasowak and the pk enclave south poo f the Ravu river caked jassar. The latter included the Ravi rail road bridge which connected Indian Punjab with the potential to outflank Indian defences at Amritsar and  pathankot. In the DERA NANAK area the main Pakistani thrust was likely to come across the Ravi as these was the danger of the enemy breaking out with armour particularly through thebared between Rania  and DERA BABA NANAK three armoured regiments were located north of amirtsar. An artillery brigade less two regiments wea also moved north to provide artillery support. As stated earlier, the bridge over the Ravi near DERA BABA NANAK lay within Pakistan territory and that a Pakistani enclave lay to the south of that bridge. The town was a gateway to major towns of Gurdaspir batala bras and Amritsar and it's occupation by Pakistan could easily unbalnce the Indian defences. After the pre emptive strike by Pakistan on 3 December, India decided to eliminate the Pak enclave there. As the area were marshy and covered by thick growth of elephant grass kikar and shisham trees, the strength and disposition of Pakistani forces could not be assessed accurately. However, it was estimated that there were 3 Ranger posted in addition to a network of defences occupied by the units of regular army. DERA BABA NANAK akal the layout of the important features was as follows.

​​​​During the Indo Pak war of 1971, Indian Navy named its most daring and awe inspiring operation as operation Trident. It was of course symbolic of Trishul the invincible three pronged weapon of shiva the Great God. When the war of 1971 was looking large on the horizon, Indian Navy was headed by Admiral SM Nanda the then chief of the Naval staff. Vice Admiral N Krishnan and vice admiral later admiral SN kohli were.learding the eastern was western commands respectively. They meticulously planned the naval response in the emerging scenario. In the event of war was the western Navel command based at Mumbai was to engage and destroy as many Pakistani naval ships as possible so that the Pakistani Navy became incapable of attacking our shipping and launching attack on Indian soil from the sea. It was during this time that the plan to attack Karachi was fine tuned and operation Trident was conceived. By the time the bugle of war was sounded on the evening of 3 December 1971 the Indian Navy had already deployed it's western fleet in the North Arabian sea. A special Task Group comprising two Letha class Corvettes and four  Missile Boats intended to launch an urgent missile attack was awaiting orders off the coast of saurashtra. The plan of operation was clear and simple though risky. The special Task Group was to approach Karachi during the night launch missiles from a distance of about 20 nautical miles and withdraw before dawn to avoid Pakistani Air Force attack. The plan provided that the Group after reaching 159 miles from Karachi at sunset would go at maximum speed during night to carry out attack and withdraw again at a maximum speed. Invisiblity in the night was to be exploited as best as possible. As per the plan, on the Moonless night of 3 December three missile boats, Nirghat Nipat and veer and the two Letha class ships katchall and Iran proceeded towards Karachi Lt CDR later code Sharma commanding officer INS Nirghat. 

BATTLE OF LONGEWALA Longewa, a border village is located in the jaisalmer district of Rajasthan. It is said that in earlier times the trade of Laing or cloves between some and Ajmer passed through this place and hence the place got this name. The village is a desert area some 16 km from the international border with Pakistan. There were no roads to connect LONGEWALA to the border and a camel or camel cart fitted with lsand tyres were the only means of transport. It was here that the Indians fought on e of the fiercest battles during the war of 1971. The LONGEWALA post was held by a platoon of border security force before the war. In octOcto1971 when the cloude of was started the gathering a company of 23 Punjab Regiment was deployed to defend the post. It is notable that 23 Punjab was a part of 45 infantry brigade of the 12 Indian Division which was responsible for the defense of the jaidlamer sub sector. Indians did not expect any major offensive by the pakistani army in thisp desert area. Also no military a ctivties were observed on the Pakistan side of military activities were observed on the border opposite LONGEWALA by Indian patrols till the commencement of the war. Indians thus believed that Pakistan would concentrate more on protecting rail and road communication opposite jaisalmer on their side of the border. But Pakistan had some different plan. In fact Pakistan had deployed an infantry Division 18 infantry divison for operations in LONGEWALA while one more Division 33 Division to reinforce it required. On the Indian side only one company of 23 Punjab Regiment under Major kuldip Singh chandpur was deployed to defend the area totall unaware of the lurking danger. On the cold breezy night of 4|5 December captain Dharam Vir a young officer of the company was leading a patrol near the border. Suddenly, at midnight, he heard the rattling of tanks from across the border. The noise gradually became louder indicating the movement of the Pakistani army towards the Indian post .captain Dharam Vir reported the matter to company commander major kuldip Singh chandpur. Another patrol in the area also confirmed the movement.

BATTLE OF DARSANA During the Info - Pak war 1971 India launched a four pronged attack on East Pakistan. 8 corpos in the north west 3 corps in the west 4 corps in the East and 101 CZA in the north penetrated from four directions to bring an early end to the web TN Raina carried the attack in Jessore jhenida.sector with 4 and 9 Divisions. Pakistan had pitted 9 Divisions to defend the area.  4 Division which had secured some Pak border observation posts East of karimpur before the declaration of war was tasked to capture nodal points of jhenida and Mathura to clear the way for ferry sites at Madhumati and Padma rivers. But to advance on Tibanagar kotchandpur kaligani jhenida axis the route selected by the Division commander the Pak BOP at DARSANA had to be neutralised. The task was entrusted to 41 Brigade 5\1 Gurkha 2|9 Gurkha 22 Rajput 5 Guards and a squadron of 54 Cavalry with orders to accomplish it by the last light on 5 December. DARSANA was an important tactical feature close to west Bengal border and dominated the axes uthali kapasdanga and uthali chaufanga the Pak commander had organized the Defence of DARSANA in five segments Viz front line bunkers club area DARSANA halt Railway station and village chandpur. Each segment was protected by shell proof bunkers make of railway sleepers. These could be cleared only with artillery and tank support. The Pakistani 18 Punjab supported by chaffer tanks mortars and guns was entrusted with the task of defending DARSANA. They had dug up anti tank trenches on all sides and had covered the south and east approaches with mines. The Pakistani commander himself considered his eastern defences impregnable on account of mines and eastern defences impregnable on account of mines and bunkers. Incidentally, the Indian 41 Brigade chose to attack DARSANA from the eastern side. As per the Brigade plan 5|1 Gurkha Rifles was to capture Darsane halt, railway station club area and chandpur in the first phase.

INS VIKRANT THE SEA WARRIOR During the 7971 war taking into consideration the overall strategic picture Naval Headquarters allocated the aircraft carrier INS Vikrant to the Eastern Fleet. It was to serve as the nucleus of the Indian naval interdiction and strike force operating against the enemy in the BAY of Bengal. But the Indian planners suspected that Pakistan would deploy at least one of its submarines to target it and took every possible measaure to protect it. Of the Pakistani submarines, PNS Ghazi was the one which had range and capability to undertake operations in the distant waters. Hence a little before the hostilites brroke out on 3 Decemder ghazi was mine laying there and to sink INS Vikrant the backbone of Indian Navy.

BATTLE OF CHHAMB  A major battle took place in the CHHAMB area during the war of 1971. The terrain here is a mix of flat open ground cross crossed by rivers and a number of hilly features. The higher on third area is covered with hills while lower two third is flat and open ideal for the movement of tanks. The village of CHHAMB situated to the left of Manawar Tawi River lies in the centre. CHHAMB was strategically important to both India and Pakistan. It Pakistan made a thrust through CHHAMB and proceeded to capture Akhunur bridge over chenab it could cut off all the Indian troops deployed in the western half of Jammu province Naushera Rajouri and Punch. Indian pre emptive thrust on the other hand could impede the movement of Pak forces from the karian Jhelum complex to the Lahore sialkot sector.  10 Infantry Division under Major General Jaswant Singh was made responsible for defending this sector. Going by the dictum offense is the best form of defence the Division planned a limited offensive in this sector to grab the initiative from Pakistan. To this end. 68 Infantry Brigade 5/8 Gurkha Rifles 9 Jat and 7 kumaon was assigned the task of launching an attack into Pakistani occupied territory while 52 Infantry Brigade and 191 Infantry Brigade were to stand in support by securing a firm based. One squadron of Horse Deccan horse was allotted to 68 infantry brigade for the offensive. The brigade concentrated at Akhunur to launchthe offensive while 52 Infantry Brigade prepared to protect akhnur town and the bridge. 191 infantry brigade took position across the manawar tawi river.